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THE AFRICAN CHARTER AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AFRICA
Claude E. Welch, Jr.
One of the most disputed areas in contemporary human rights law is
that of freedom of expression. How far does this right extend, particularly when
threats to national security (real or presumed) exist? The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights expresses this tension in Article 19 through the
following words:'
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his [sic] choice.
3. The exercise ofthe[se] rigts.. carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, butthese shall only be such as are provided by law
and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of
others;
(b) Forthe protection of natbnalsecurityor
of public order (ordre pub/), or of public
health and morals.
These words of the ICCPR are regularly tested in courts around the
world. Cases such as the Pentagon Papers provide encouraging evidence of
judicial skepticism about wide-ranging claims of national security overriding
0 Distinguished Service Professor, Department of Political Science, State University of
New York at Buffalo and Co-Director ofthe Buffalo Human Rights Center. An earlier
version of this artide appears as a chapter in SECRECYAND UJBErry: NATIONAL SECURrry,
FREEDOM OF EXPRSSKNANDACCESS TO INFORMATION (Sandra Coliver, Joan Fdzpatrick
& Paul Hoffman eds., forthcoming 1998).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(enteredinto force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added).
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freedom of expression and information.2 This is an exceptional case, however.
Taking the world as a whole, claims of freedom of expression and information
that collide with national security are more often denied than upheld, even with
the wave of post-Cold War democratization.
Major non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Article 19,?
seek to clarify the respective limits of and restrictions upon freedom of
expression. One of the most significant recent attempts at clarification came in
October 1995 when a group of distinguished specialists met in South Africa to
draft the "Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression
and Access to Information." This succinct statement includes twenty-five
principles, subdivided among general principles, restrictions on freedom of
expression, restrictions on freedom of information, and rule of law and other
matters. I shall summarize those principles4 concerned with freedom of
expression, examine the significance of international pressure from NGOs on
governments, and then turn specifically to Africa and the role of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission or
Commission) as a case study in application of evolving human rights standards.
Whattypes of expression could threaten national security? In the words
of Principle 6, only an expression "intended" and "likely" to incite imminent
violence s By contrast, notinduded among threats are: advocacy of non-violent
change of government policy; criticism of or insult to the nation, the state or its
symbols, the government, or a foreign nation; objection to military conscription
orservice, a particular conflict, or threat of use of force; on the basis of religion,
conscience, or belief; or communication of information about alleged violations
of international human rights standards or intemational humanitarian law.
2 NewYorkTimes Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). It must be immediately noted,
however, that no reference was made to Article 19 of the ICCPR in this litigation, the
Supreme Court making its decision in accordance with American constitutional practice.
3 Artide 19 draws its title from the section ofthe ICCPR quoted above, see supra note
I, and from Artide 19 of the Universal Dedaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A
(I II), U.N. DocA8 10, at71 (1948). See, e.g.,Richard Carver, ARTICLE 19,TRUTH FROM
BELOW: THE EMERGENT PRESS IN AFRICA 86-7 (199 1) [hereinafter TRUrH FROm BELOW];
seeasoARTIcLE 19, INFORMATKN, FREEDOMAND CENSOFSHIPWORLD REPORT 1988, at
viii (1988).
4 See Article 19, The Johannesburg Prindples on Naional Security, Freedom of
Expession andAccess to Information. 20 HuM. RTS. Q. I, 4-6 (1998) (Principles 5 to
II).
s See id. at 5, Principle 6(a) & (b).
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Further, expression "can never be prohibited on the ground that it is in a
particular language, especiallythe language of a national minority."6 Governments
must take "reasonable measures to prevent private groups or individuals from
interfering unlawfully with the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression.... .'
An equally impressive set of statements on freedom of information is also
included in the Johannesburg Principles.' Clearly, the drafters wanted to carve
out a wide arena within which freedom of expression and freedom of
information would flourish. How closely do these ideas track with existing
practice?
Although articulated in Africa, the Johannesburg Principles bear little
resemblance to current reality north or south of the Sahara. The fifty-plus states
of the continent have long been characterized by governments intolerant of
criticism, by restrictions on media coverage said to be justified by situations of
national emergency, and by severe limitations on freedom of expression.
Historically set patterns have continued into the present
A cynic might argue, "Whaes new?" Widespread flouting of constitutional
guarantees and unwillingness to honor commitments to international human
rights treaties have characterized the majority of African states in their thirty-five
plus years of independence. The continuities rather than contrasts are striking.
Freedom of expression was subjected to significant restraints when Africa was
divided among various colonial powers. The limits imposed in the colonial
period were in many respects enhanced following independence, rather than
relaxed or abolished. The veneer of democratization that accompanied the
achievement of self-government was rapidly stripped away by leaders anxious to
preserve their version of national unity, and/or by military elites who shot their
way into power. Multi-party systems -were consolidated into single-party
systems, then into one-man systems. With the "second independence" of the
1990s, in which open political competition returned to many countries, freedom
of expression seemed to obtain a new lease on life. In my judgment, however,
the overall climate remains inhospitable.
The question that arises here is whether international pressures and
NGO activity (both domestic and international can help overcome obstacles to
freedom of expression erected in the name of national security. Although
Id. at 6, Principle 9.
7 Id. at 6, Principle 10.
8 Seeid.at5-8, Principles 11-19.
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conventions such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' or the
ICCPR have been widely ratified,"0 their impact appears to have been limited.
Govemmental willingness to employ a variety of pressures against the media and
individuals on grounds of "national security" has been a long-term feature of the
African scene.
This article adopts a continent-wide approach, rather than concentrating
on a single country. Because Aica was subjected to a particularly strong, intense
form of colonial rule, individual governments were endowed with powerful
means of restrainingthe media and restrictingfreedom of expression. This article
also provides more of a political perspective on freedom of expression
throughout Africa than a legal one. Where the rule of law is not firmly
established, considerations of power dominate. The rights which Article 19,
Human Rights Watch, International PEN and other major NGOs concerned with
freedom of expression seek to globally enhance require political as well as legal
strategies.
The reasons for the parlous state of affairs in many African countries, it
seems, are tvofold. They involve, paradoxically, both the strength and the
weakness of African governments and the societies over which they attempt to
rule. The state is in crisis; civil society is weak. The "patrimonial administrative
state" of tropical Africa created under colonial rule and continued after
independence became what Callaghy aptly deemed a 'lame leviathan."" In
theory, the administrative state dislosed of vast powers; in reality, it existed as
a means of transferring resources to small groups of politically privileged.
Government activities south of the Sahara became, in the telling words of Bayart,
the "politics of the belly."'2
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEGI67I3 rev.5
(1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21 1986) [hereinafter African Charter],
10 According to HUM. RTs. LJ., fifty-one African countries had ratified the African
Charter as of January I, 1997 (the exceptions being Ethiopia and Morocco which
withdrewfrom the Organization ofAkican Unity following its recognition ofthe Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic). The ICCPR has been ratified by 136 countries (the African
exceptions being Botswana, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, not considered a state by the United
Nations, South Africa and Swaziland). Jean-Marie Bernard, International Instruments
Relat'ngto Human RNqht, 18HuM.RTS. LJ.79, 84,86(1997).
" ThomasM.Calaghy, The Stateav Lame Letiathan: The PatrimonialAdminktrae
State in Afca inTHEAFCAN STATEINTRANSrrION 87, 87, III (Zaki Ergas ed., 1987)
12 JEAN-FR*iNOisBAYART, THE STATE INAFRCA THE POLITIcS OFTHE BELLY (1993).
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But not merely interest in self and group enrichment drove national
leaders. They responded to growing disjunctures between state and society.
Concern about secession or ethnically-inspired unrest marked many countries.
Civil society has cohered more around ethnic group or region than around
putative nation - a development, Ekeh reminds us, with deep historic roots.13
Asa resultthe specter of"tribalism" haunts Africa.14 Major building blocks of civil
society as conceived of largely by Western scholars remain weak, and hence the
protection offreedom of expression remains limited. Human rights NGOs and
privately-owned media in Africa confront enormous obstacles to their
functioning. Political leaders remain intent on maintainingtheir control, despite
(and because of) their weaknesses. Governments possess multiple means of
restraint on freedom of expression. Poor, and in many respects worsening,
economic conditions constrain the development ofthe press; radio, which serves
as the most important means of communication, has almost without exception
rerained underdirect government control. Political dissidents have found their
liberties circumscribed - and have sometimes been killed for their beliefs.
Irrespective of liberal constitutional guarantees, the domestic reality has been
severe restrictions on freedom of expression. Accordingly, domestically civil
society is fragmented, while governments are narrowly based and fearful. There
should be little wonderthat major limits on freedom of expression exist, and that
these limits have yet to be effectively challenged from within most African
countries.
This phenomenon within individual African states has been paralleled in
important respects by modest international initiatives. Neither international
treaties, entreaties from important NGOs, nor even pressure from major aid-
givers, have cracked the panoply of national security legislation that restricts
freedom of expression through much of the continent The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights contains very limited protection for freedom of
expression. The African Commission, established by the African Charter,'" has
given little serious attention to freedom of expression, for a variety of reasons
subsequently explored. Article 19, PEN and other global NGOs have focused
attention on problems, but can claim only limited successes to date. Despite
rhetoric about linking foreign assistance with greater governmental openness,
'3 Seega*Peter P. Ekeh, Cabras'n andfhe Tw oPublicsinAfic 'A Theoretcal
Statement, 17 COMP. STUD. IN SOC'Y & HIST. 91 (1975).
,4 See id. at 108-9.
's African Charter, supra note 9, arts. 30-64.
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 4
such conditionalities have been irregularly applied. On the other hand, pressures
for democratization (internal and external) have started to expand attention and
protection given to freedom of expression. NGOs should and will play an
increasing role in this effort. It will be a lengthy struggle, requiring profound
changes in attitudes about national security and significant alterations in the
functioning of human rights treaty bodies. Strengthening of civil society, of
constitutional and legal protections, and of freedom of expression should go
hand-in-hand in this process.
In this article, I shall examine the following:
I. the armature of the "colonial state," which laid the basis
historically for restrictions on freedom of expression
throughout the African continent;
2. the unusual combination of optimism about the ease of
change, characteristic of the early stage of self-government in
Africa, with growing awareness of the inability of political
institutions to resolve conflict effectively;
3. increased use of emergency powers to bolster post-
independence governments, a process that proved
unsuccessful as military coups d'4tat and domestic conflicts
roiled the political cauldron;
4. problerms both in the wording of the African Charter, and in
the limited powers of, ahd support for, the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights; these exacerbate the
weakness of political institutions and the tendency to resort to
claims of national security to restrict freedom of expression;
and
5. limited efforts by domestic and international human rights
groups, and by external governments, to pressure newly-
emergent African governments for effective guarantees for
freedom of expression.
I. COLONIAL RooTs OF LIMITATIONS
The roots of national security legislation lie in colonial history. The
precedent for extensive governmental involvement in media regulation was set
priorto 1960. In Howard's words, "[t]he idea that the African press should not
be critical of the established government is thus a direct legacy of the colonial
108
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period."'6 Whether by arn9 ordinance, decree, or act of a national assembly, the
various administrations were endowed with sweeping regulatory powers.
The colonial state in Africa, as Young has convincingly demonstrated,
differed in some fundamental respects from earlier historical examples of colonial
government 7 The implantation of European rule occurred with extraordinary
rapidity; it coincided with the height of racist beliefs; and it sought dramatic
transformation of societies to overcome chronic economic under-
development. Administrators imposed their versions of pax Britannica and did
not welcome dissent. From early in the colonial period, security legislation
quelled criticism. These powers were used frequently against "nationalists" who
sought self-government and against the small, late-developing press linked to
post-World War II nationalist parties.'9
When independence came, many foreign-owned media were taken
over by the state.2" As a result, the press came to reflect the interests of the
political elite.2' Few African states could boast a vigorous fourth estate -
vigorous in the sense of watching dosely over government actions - within a few
years of independence. Why? The reasons can be found not only in colonial
history, but also in the perceptions of African leaders. Freedom of expression
was a casualty of their emphasis on the central importance of national unity.
16 RHODA E. HOWARD, HuMAN RiGHis IN COMMONWEALTH AFRiCA 121 (1986).
'7 5-eCRAWFORDYOUNG, THE AFR-AN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1994).
,B The Belgian, British, French and other colonial overloads believed firmly that the new
possessions should finance their own development, by blood as well as by taxes.
'" Note should be taken, however, of Ghana (Gold Coast), Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
In Hachten's words, 'ain exception [to the journalist traditions of European influence or
African nationalist influence], and a bright exception at that, was British West Africa where
a firm tradition of African-run, owned and read newspapers preceded similar
developments elsewhere on the continent by half a century or more." WILLIAM A.
F-CHrEN, MUFLED DRUMS: THENEws MEDIAINAFRicA5 (1971). SeeasoGuNILLAL
FARINGER, PRESS FREEDOM IN AicA2-9 (199 1).
o For exmple, the government acquired a maority share in the Dafy 77mesof Nigeria
by 1975, when the indigenization decree mandated national ownership; in other
countries, such steps came earlier.
21 See HACHTEN, supra note 19, at 38-47; seegenera//'FRiNGER, supra note 19.
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II. NATIONAL"EMERGENCY'AND LIMITATIONS
Kwame Nkrumah, the first African Prime Minister and President of
Ghana - itselfthe first tropical African colony to gain independence - wrote a
striking comment in his autobiography:
What other countries have taken three hundred years or more
to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish
in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it is, as it were, 'jet-
propelled," it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which
it has fought But even a system based on social justice and a
democratic constitution may need backing up, during the
period following independence, by emergency measures of a
totalitarian kind. Without discipline, true freedom can not
survive n
The sentiments expressed by Nkrumah became commonplace. A
contradictory sense of optimism and crisis permeated African presidential palaces.
On the one hand, euphoria generated by the unexpected ease with which
independence had been gained in most states by the mid-I 960s (with the
obvious exceptions of Portuguese colonies and the white minority redoubts of
Narnibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) gave African leaders a sense they could,
and must, compress stages of "nation-building."' Progress toward unity, they
felt, was absolutely essential. The advent of home rule raised the complex
question, "who shall rule at home?" Ethnic sentiments became more acute. In
a process recognized by all students of African politics, force rather than consent
became the currency of change. Govemmentweakness rather than strength led
to increased authoritarianism. Cenfral institutions declined in their effectiveness.
Using strikingly similar words, leading scholars opined that presidents such as
Nkrumah worked within "an almost complete institutional vacuum at the central,
national level; 4 "the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it
constitutes an almost institution-less arena with conflict and disorder as its most
KwAE NNKRuMAH, GHAN THEArOBOGAPHYOF KWAE NKRlmAH, at xvi (1957).
SSeega /,'VV lliam Foltz, Building the Nevest Naions: Short-Run SfRategies and
Long-Run ProbLems, in NATION BUILDING 117 Q(arl W. Deutsch &William J. Foltz, eds.
1963).
POLITIC PARTIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN TROpiCAL AFRicA 2 Qames S.
Coleman & Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds. 1964).
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prominent features." 5
There is not space in this article to examine the twists and turns of post-
independence politics. Major post-independence events include the following.
i. rosy visions of rapid economic development were replaced,
especially from the mid-I 970s, with the reality of agricultural
stagnation, declining per capita GNP, and a growing gap
between African states and other"developing!' countries;26
2. authoritarianism and personalized rule increased, with
peaceful changes of government practically unknown27
3. limitations on freedom of expression, and in particular of the
press, came- largely from government actions, such as
censorship, harassment of editors and reporters, and state
takeovers;
28
4. one of the basic principles of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), non-interference in the internal affairs of states,
has been used to justify a no/i me tangere attitude among
African leaders, for whom protection of domestic sovereignty
and retention of position have been paramount values.
National leaders, whether elected, self-proclaimed, or beneficiaries of
military seizures of power, used national security legislation to restrict freedom
' Aristide R. Zolberg, The Structure ofPolf'cal Conflictin the NewStates of Tropical
Affca, 62 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 70,70 (1968).
1 For example, in 1960 Ghana and South Korea were characterized by roughly similar
gross national products per capita. By the early nineties, an extraordinary gap had
opened: South Korea, ranked 31 of 174 countries by the U.N. Development
Programme, had a per capita GNP of $7,220 in 1992; Ghana, mired at 129 in the same
ranldng, had a per capita GNP of $460! However, the U.N. Development Programme
also calculated "real" GDP per capita, making the gap much smaller: South Korea,
$9,250; Ghana, $2,110. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1995, at 158-59 (1995).
' Between 1965 and 1990, more than seventy-five successful coups d'dtat were
staged in Arica, most notabAy in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritania and
Nigeria each experienced at least four); peaceful change of government and dominant
party through elections occurred only in the unusual island state of Mauritius (1982). I
am not induding transitions within the same party following resignation or death of a
president, such as the changes in Somalia (1967), Kenya (1978) or Cameroon (1982).
1 HowARD, supranote 16, at 120.
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of expression. The results were bleak. Although there have been exceptions,
the decades following were heydays of authoritarianism. Some noteworthy
changes came in the early 1990s when a "second independence" swept through
parts of the continent. Democratization and concomitant emphasis on media
openness have, in the view of several observers, opened new opportunities for
freedom of expression. As Carver noted, Tt]hus the independent press which
has emerged in recent years is, for most African countries, the flrstindependent
press that has been there. 9
How has this state of affairs been affected by human rights institutions,
induding inter-governmental groups such as the African Commission, or NGOs
such as Article 19?
III. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND MONITORING
We must recognize that, with the "second independence" and with
ratification of human rights conventions, governments in Africa have started to
confront a new situation. The long-standing assumptions of untrammeled
domestic sovereignty and limited criticism of government activities have now
been challenged.
As we have seen, the African political elite utilized - and continue to
draw upon - restrictive national security legislation to limit freedom of
expression. They drew lessons from their colonial predecessors, and added new
twists. Domestic voices of dissent have been and continue to be stilled --
although the conditions they documented cannot be fully concealed. The
majority of African governments have ratified international treaties in which they
pledged to uphold freedom of expression. They thereby became potentially
open to external pressure and monitoring. How effective have these avenues
proven to be? In particular, what impact can be attributed to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights?
The African Commission has, since its creation in 1987, played a
marginal role in protecting freedom of expression. In both legal and political
terms it appears to be a weak, but not an irrelevant player in efforts to achieve
accountability of African leaders.
The African Charter gives the weakest formulation of freedom of
expression of any major international human rights document. According to
29 TRUTH FROM BELOW, supra note 3, at 12 (italics original).
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Article 9, "[elvery indMdual shall have the right to receive information[, and]
[e]very individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinion
within the law."3° The last three words exemplify the cautious, state-centered
approach found within the Charter, further reflected in many ways by the actions
- and inactions - of the African Commission. "[W]ithin the lawv' as a phrase
opens the door, at leasttheoretically, to any sort of raison d'etat It is a dawback
clause, restricting rights from the start?' Other major human rights treaties give
considerably less scope to such restrictions. The ICCPR speaks of"certain
restrictions," adding "but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary: (a) For the respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the
protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or public health
or morals."' The ICCPR the European Convention on Human Rights, and the
American Convention on Human Rights are all treaties more rigorous,34 and
systems more vigorous, in protecting freedom of expression. Umitations are
clear rather than vague; bodies of precedent and experience have developed;
communications are numerous and carefully vetted; well-qualified (albeit
overworked) professionals provide staff support; govemrnments criticized by the
treaty bodies usually modify the offending laws or practices. I regret to say that,
as of the time of writing, these points did not apply to the African Charter or the
Commission. A vague or weakly-worded treaty can be developed or
interpreted overtime, ifthe political will is present. The limitations of the African
Charter are striking; even more, in the case of freedom of expression, the
political will to interpret the wording of the African Charter broadly has not been
present.
30 African Charter, supranote 9, art. 9.
31 d.
Richard Gittleman, The BanIul Cha'ter on Human and People's Rghts: A Legal
Ana/ss Ah HuMAN RiTS AND DEVELOPMENT INAFRIcA 152, 158-62 (Qaude E. Welch,
Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984).
ICCPP, supra note I, art. 19(3).
34 Id.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (enteredinto force Sept. 3, 1953), amended by
Protocol Nos. 3 (entered into force Sept. 21, 1970), 5 (entered into force Dec. 20,
1971), 8 (enteredinto foreJan. I, 1990) [hereinafter European Convention]; See also
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, OAS.T.S. No. 36, OEA'Ser.L.V.AI.82
doc.6 rev.I at 25 (1969), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July, 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention].
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In the decade since the African Charter entered into force, a wave of
democratization has swept over much ofthe continent. Far greater attention has
been generally given to human rights. However, condusions that freedom of
expression has drawn significant attention from the African Commission, or that
restrictive national security legislation has been rescinded, would be
unwarranted. The undoubted progress in South Africa since the freeing of
Nelson Mandela, and the more restricted changes in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) countries, are encouraging, but far from
cortinent-wide in their scope. The "second independence" promised far more
than thus far delivered. The record of the Afican Commission to date has been
spotty, as it has been hampered by the wording of the Charter, by
Commissioners' reluctance, and by the inadequacies of government actions.
Clawback clauses constitute a particularly insidious way of weakening
international human rights obligations. Gittleman quotes from the Constitution
of the Republic of Zaire (now renamed Congo), exemplifying the ease with
which national security can be invoked in proclaiming a state of emergency:
If serious circumstances imminently threaten the Nation's
independence or integrity or cause an interruption in the
regular functioning of the organs of the Popular Movement of
the Revolution or jeopardize vital State interests . . . the
President of the Republic may proclaim a state of emergency,
with the consent of the Political Bureau?'
Why is the wording ofthe African Charter so cautious? In brief, because
ofthe timing and circumstances of its preparation. As I have written elsewhere,
[t]he Charter was drafted on behalf of the Organization of
African Unity [QAUJ by persons sympathetic to governments'
desires (perhaps interpreted as necessities and preconditions),
and desirous of induding African values. The OAU itself was
far more concerned early in its history with ensuring stability for
newly independent countries and self-determination for
remaining colonial areas, than with protection of human rights
SiGRleman, supranote 32, at 160 (quoting the Constitution of the Republic of Zaire)
(emphasis added).
1998 AFRICAN CHARTER AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 115
within its member states.36
In orderto ensure adoption byAhican heads of state gathered atthe 1981 OAU
summit and ratification by governments subsequently, the language chosen gave
states wide discretion. The brief, government-centered wording of Article 9 of
the African Charter should be contrasted with the comparable, lengthier sections
of the European Convention and the American Convention. 7 Amending the
Charterto strengthen its provisions is, in my judgment, quite unlikely.
Does the African Commission have the power, resources and
willingness to enhance protection of freedom of expression within the narrow
confines of Article 9 and other parts of the African Charter? I believe not under
current conditions. Several commentators on the African Commission have
urged it to become more active in interpreting the Charter. Slowly and
hesitantly, a few steps have been taken. 8 For example, Commissioners have
taken it upon themselves to examine reports from States Party in public session,
although the Charter is by no means clear that this is what the framers intended.
Non-governmental human rights organizations have attended Commission
sessions in greater numbers, and started to generate additional documents for
its members' consideration. In my view, the most important changes in the
activity level of the African Commission will come when I) States Party report
seriously on freedom of expression and 2) NGOs concerned with this topic
press both the Afican Commission and individual governments more vigorously
for action.
The major responsibility of the African Commission lies in its
examination of reports from the States Party to the African Charter. Reporting
serves at least seven functions, aptly delineated by Alston:
I. initial review, through which the supervisory committee
becomes aware of the relevant domestic law and practice;
2. monitoring, based on detailed review of current
developments, as a step toward identfying and remedying
6 CAuDE EWcH,JR., ProTcnNG HUMAN RGHTS IN MFcx ROLES AND STRATEGIES
OF NON-GOVERNMENTALORGIATIONS 149 (1995).
37 See European Convention, supra note 34, art. 13; American Convention, supra
note 33, art. 10.
' Seecommentaries on sessions of the African Commission, published periodically in
NETH. HUM. RTS. Q.
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human rights problems;
3. policy formulation, in which governments take steps
(hopefully!) to respond to the problems identified;
4. public scrutiny, in which governmental accountability is
enhanced both internationally and domestically;
5. evaluation, in which both states and supervisory bodies
assess changes made overtime;
6. acknowledgment of problems, in which governments
become more candid in their discussion of human rights issues;
and
7. information exchange, perhaps most notably through
general comments by supervisory committees.
39
In almost all these respects, the African Commission has been
hampered or deficient to date. Initial reviews of reports have been brief; more
important, States Party have submitted patently inadequate documentation.40 It
has thus proven difficult to establish a baseline of information. Monitoring has
been impeded by sketchy reports - or utterly precluded by failure to submit any
reports whatsoever. The physical isolation of the African Commission in The
Gambia has limited the extent to which Commissioners or governments can
learn from each other, chronic staff shortages and problems have affected the
Commission's efficiency; and general comments remain at a rudimentary stage.
39 Philip Alston, The Purposes ofReport, in MANUAL ON HumAN RiGHTS REPORTING
UNDER Six MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HumAN IiGHTS INSTRUMENTS, at 13-16, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/9 I/I (1991).
4 The case of Nigeria, which I treat in greater detail in a recent book, WELCH, supra
note 36, at 154-55, is instructive. What can be kindly viewed as bureaucratic confusion
meant that Nigerias first attempt at a report consisted of nothing more than the table of
contents of its suspended constitution! By the nineteenth session of the Commission,
held in March 1996, the Commission had examined reports from barely a dozen states;
the great majority of States Party had yet to furnish their initial reports, which provide the
baseline information on which subsequent discussion would be based. On the other
hand, lateness in submitting reports is hardly confined to Africa!
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There is little evidence that comments from the African Commission have been
seriously heeded by governments in reformulating policies, although the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, established as a result of the ICCPR has scored
some successes.4 Public scrutiny has been practically non-existent- reports by
States Party have been drafted by bureaucrats who rarely communicate with
human rights activists; comments made by members of the African Commission
disappear into filing cabinets. On the brighter side, some states (notably Senegal)
have reported more than once, and their second reports have been more open
in acknowledging issues.
As of the middle of 1996, the Commission had not devoted any lengthy
attention to Article 9 ofthe Charter in analyzing reports from States Party. Quite
naturally, chief attention has been focused on these reports. Iore pressing
issues, such as extra-judicial executions or creation of an African Court of Human
Rights, have come to the fore when the Commission examines lacunae in the
Charter. In part, the Commission's limited attention to freedom of expression
has also been due to the lack of information in the initial reports. Details have
been limited. Governments have often reported in formats other than an article-
by-article march through the Charter. A few examples from the reports will
suffice.42 Though fifty pages in length, the initial report from Egypt merely
mentioned that the constitution contains the "freedom and the right of...
journalism." Ubya asserted, [ejvery one enjoys freedom of opinion, research
and creativity," then added, 'these rights are exercised without disturbing public
order or morality." Neither Cape Verde, Rwanda nor Tanzania made any
explicit mention of freedom of expression in thetFP initial reports. Togo
confidently proclaimed, without any detail, that 'fundamental human rights and
freedoms" are spelled out in its constitution. The Gambia quoted the relevant
section of the countr/s constitution, whose wording was clearly inspired by
Article 19 ofthe ICCPR; Senegal also made specific reference to its constitution
and laws in discussing freedom of expression. I need not go further. With such
sketchy information coming from official sources, members of the African
4" See Cindy A Cohn, The Eai4' Harvest. Domestic Legal Ohanges Related to the
Human ffghts Committee and the Covenant on C 7andPoNcalght, 13 HUM. RTS.
Q. 295, 298-300, 321 (199 1); See also Ineke Boerefljn, Towarda StrongSstem of
Supervision: The Human R'ghts COmmittee's Role in Reforming the Reporf'ng
Procedure underArtide 40 ofthe Covenanton wVandPoi/ca/gh, 17 HuM. RTs.
Q. 766 (1995).
SAll quotations are from reports submitted under the African Charter by the
governments cited, in the possession of the author.
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Commission (assuming they are interested) must seek details about freedom of
expression from other sources. Reports from ratifying countries are necessary,
but they are not sufficient to examine the freedom of expression in indMdual
African states.
The African Commission has the power to receive and make
recommendations on communications. Communications, which have usually
been generated by NGOs, call to the Commission's attention alleged violations
of the Charter not resolved through domestic courts or by other means. These
must, as is common for international human rights treaty bodies, go through a
lengthy, complex and often unatisfactory process of consideration.43 Upto mid-
1996, only one communication had been filed - by International PEN -alleging
specific violation of freedom of expression, in this case by the Government of
Ghana; the communication itself was withdrawn before the Commission could
take anyaction. Rve others, all also filed by International PEN, dealt with alleged
false imprisonment ofwriters oreditors; PEN argued, implicitly, that freedom of
expression had been denied. The fate of these communications may be
instructive: one directed against Malawi, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Kenya, and
another directed solely against Malawi, were both declared inadmissible since the
four sttes had not ratified the African Charter, a third, arising in Burkina Faso,
was dismissed since the applicant had been released before the Commission
could consider the communication;45 the fourth, coming from Sudan, was not
considered due to "non-exhaustion of local remedies;' and in the last, arising
in C6te d'lvoire, an amnesty had "extirpated the legal effects of detention" which
two journalists critical d the President had suffered!47 A languorous pace has
43 SeeWELCH, supranote36,at 157-61.
44 See Interr&nonal PEN v. Malaw, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Kenya, Communication
19I88, SEE?'HANNUAL ACMTy REPORr OFTHEAFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1993-1994 (June 13-15, 1994), 30th Ordinary session,
<http://www.umn.edunumanrts/arica/ACHPR2.htm>; InternationalPEN v. Malawv
Communication 42/90, id
s See Intemational PEN v Bwrina Faso, Communication 22/88, id
Interntonal PEN v. Sudan (In respect ofKemal a-Jazoull Communication 92/93,
EBGHTHANNUALACTMTY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES
RIGHTS 1994-1995 (June 26-28, 1995), 31st Ordinary Session <http://
www.umn.edu/numanrtsarica/ACHPRI .htm.>.
4 See lnt PEN on behlfof Senn & Sangwa .Cvte d'voire, Communication
138/94, id; I wish to thank Dr. Gerd Oberleitner of the Institute of International Law and
International Relations, University of Graz, for this information.
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been typical of the African Commission, hampered through most of its history by
a poorly-staffed secretariat and by a high degree of caution of many members.
I do not wish to condude this artide on a pessimistic note. it is my
contention that, despite the inherent limitations of the African Charter and the
African Commission, pressure from below can help effect a change in the
Commission's seemingly limited interest in freedom of expression. NGOs must
play an important role in this effort
IV. A NEW ELEMENT: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONs
Up through the fourteenth session of the African Commission," there
was little active NGO involvement focused specifically on freedom of
expression;49 the situation has not changed significantly since that date. Where
NGOs have discussed media in the setting of the African Commission, it usually
has been in terms of enhancing coverage of human rights issues.
Communications on fiedom of expression, as already noted, have been limited
in number. Butthis record should not blind us to the possibilities for change that
exst
What I have referred to elsewhere as the "NGO revolutionns° has the
potential to afect freedom of expression in Africa, as in other parts of the world.
Significant intemational publicity has occurred through Artide 19s ' and
4 Held December 1-10, 1993 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.,
4 Christopher Hall, legal officer for Africa at Amnesty International, compiled a 5-page
table ofirecommendationsto lheAfican Commission from major NGOs from late 1987
through 1993; none in his compilation involved freedom of epression, although there
were several suggestions for the Commission's interpreting the African Charter and
improving the examination of States' reports. See Christopher Hall, NGO's
Recommendations to the African Commission (submitted to the African Commission
1994) (on file with the author).
o WELCH, supra note 36, at 45, 284-317.
s' Article 19 has published reports or addressed specific comments to the Geneva-
based Human Rights Committee, among others, on Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Togo, Tunisia, Zaire
(now Congo) and Zambia. However, to my knowledge, Artide 19 has not submitted
comments directly to the African Commission on countries submitting reports to it.
Reports from Human Rights Watch/Africa occasionally give attention to freedom of
expression; a noteworthy recent example is its recent study of Sudan. SeeJEMERARONE,
HUMAN RiGHTs WATCH/AFRKA BEHIND THE RED IJNE, 142-63 (1996).
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International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) a watchdog group, whose
electronic clearing house, based in Toronto, carries reports and action alerts
from groups such as the Committee to Protect Journalists (New York) or
Reporters sans frontieres (Paris). Most active among Africa-based groups has
been MISA, the Media Institute of Southern Africa, based in Windhoek, Namibia.
Founded by Narnibia-based editor Gwen Uster,'2 David Lush, and others, MISA
concentrates its attention on the largely English-speaking countries from Malawi
and Kenya to Lesotho and South Africa. MISA prepared and published the
"Declaration of Windhoek on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African
Press 3 in May 199 I. This proclaims, inter alia,
I. Consistent with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the establishment and maintenance and
fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press is
essential to the development and maintenance of democracy
in a nation, and for economic development.
4. The welcome changes that an increasing number of African
States are now undergoing towards multi-party democracies
provide the climate in which an independent and pluralistic
press can emerge.
9. African States should be encouraged to provide
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press and
freedom of association.'
MISA has kept a watchful eye over the hesitant democratization steps taken
south of the Equator. It has circulated vigorous challenges to abridgments of
freedom of expression. Among the issues MISA publicized in the first half of
1996 were the dismissal of the editor of the Times of Zambia for "'political'
52 For brief biographical details of Uster see WELCH, supra note 36, at 189-90.
s SeeARTICLE 19 (199 1), supra note 3, at 80-4.
54 Id, at 81I-2.
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reasons,"S5 the indefinite imprisonment in Zambia of two newspaper editors,
56
a proposed bill in Namibia to outlaw deliberate or unintentional publication of
'false information" on Parliament and its proceedings,5 7 and an attempt by the
President of Malawi to use sedition laws against politicians who insulted him.5
8
The Committee to ProtectJoumalists and Reporters sans frontikres reported
during the same period, among others, on arrests and imprisonment of
Gambian, Ghanaian, Guinean and Ivoirien editors and reporters.5 9 Thus,
although the African Commission was not included "in the loop" for these
communications, other human rights groups and agencies received information,
and could potentially apply pressure on the relevant governments.
There is, I believe, a major lesson here. A new pattern is emerging in
international human rights. Atrilateral ratherthan bilateral relationship can be
discerned. While the first decades of reporting on the application of human
rights involved States Party to particular conventions and the relevant examining
committee in a bilateral relationship, NGOs have now entered the scene. The
struggle has become three-cornered. This change can be observed, for
s IFEX Action Alert Service, "Times of ambia"actng managing editor dmsed for
ooli tcal'reasons (Mar. 25, 1996) <http://www.ifexorg archive>.
s6 See IFEXAction Alert Service, United Nations Human inghts Committee Members
criize indefnite imprisonment of editors (April I, 1996) <http://
www.ifex.orgJ/archive>; IFEX Action Alert Service, United Nations Human i'ghts
Committee (UNHCR) concludes that contempt charges against "7he Post' editors
violate International Covenant on C14 and Politic R/ hts 7CCPR) (Apr. 12, 1996)
<http://www.ifexorgarchive> (stating that the U.N. Human Rights Committee in
Geneva criticized the action).
s' See IFEX Action Alert Service, Draff legslon could punh reporting of Wse
inormaon';" call forpower to ban reporters vho report on dassfed infonrnation (Apr.
23, 1996) <http://www.ifexorgarchive>.
s' See IFEX Action Alert Service, President Baldi Mului threatens to use sediion laws
against opposition poliicans w'ho insult him (une 26, 1996) <http://
www.ifex.orgarchive>.
" SeelFE(Action Alert Service, -The Free Press"publ hed and editor arrested (Apr.
23, 1996) <http://www.ifexorg/archive>; IFEX Action Alert Service, ReportersA/ieu
Badara Soer and Bruce Asemota arrested and held incommunicado; police order
ff em to reva/sourres(May 8, 1996)<http:/w.ifekxorgJarchive>; IFEX Action Alert
Service, Journalist Thiemo Sadou Dialo detained (une 5, 1996)
<http:/ww.ifexorgfarchive>; IFEXAction Alert Service, Appeal Court ConArmsjafl
sentences of three journals& from TLa Voie' nevspaper (une 14, 1996)
<http://ww.ifex.org/archive>.
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example, in the extensive involvement of human rights groups in the Geneva-
based Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
MinoritiesW in the presence of non-governmental organizations in the Council
for Sustainable Development created by the Rio summit, or in the regular
workshops for African human rights NGOs organized by the International
Commission of Jurists, in conjunction with the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights. NGOs play critical roles - critical to the success of
consultation, and critical of governments that abuse human rights or submit
incomplete or misleading reports. MISA has the potential to influence the
African Commission, albeit within severe limits.
Non-govemrnmental organizations cannot, of and by themselves, make
up for serious deficiencies in international human rights documents. The
weakly-worded Article 9 of the African Charter will not be strengthened
because NGOs complain. On the other hand, NGOs can, by their
documentation,6 ' their presence at meetings, and their pressure for change,
influence how treaty bodies operate. NGOs have the potential to press the
protection of human rights generally to higher levels. Although freedom of
expression remains weakly protected in most African states, and although the
African Commission has thus far given it limited attention, increased attention
can and should be expected as a result of NGO efforts. Artide 19, the
Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters sans frontieres, Human Rights
Watch/Africa, MISA and similar groups will help create the future. What has
emerged largely since 1991 should be seen as the first major international steps
for freedom of expression to become a feature of African societies.
60 See gene&*// Karen Reierson & David Weissbrodt, The fort,-thirdsession ofthe
UNSub-Commisbn on Prevention ofDisairmination and Protection of linorites: the
Subcommiskion UnderScrutiny, 14 HUm. RTs. Q. 232 (1992).
6, SeeWELCH, supra note 36, at 211-37.
